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CONSTITUTIONAL RESERVES AND COVERT
CONSTITUTIONS
Wim J.M. Voermans*
I. Basic Structures of Constitutional Systems; Essentiality
and Constitutional Rigidity
A classical problem of constitutional law concerns the amendability
of constitutions. A good constitution expresses the will of the people but
also contains guarantees that cannot be set aside by a chance majority. On
the other hand, a constitution should not unalterably fix the dictates of the
chance majority of the founding fathers: it should also be possible to tailor
constitutions to a certain extent to the political or other needs of their time.1
Therefore most constitutions in the world are equipped with amendment
procedures that require some form of qualified majority for actual
amendments. The constraints many countries have put on constitutional
amendments are not an end in itself but a means to protect the basic
constitutional structure (system of government, democracy, independence
of the judiciary, fundamental rights) against the whim of the day. In rigid
constitutional systems – i.e. systems that require some form of qualified
majority for constitutional amendment, it is believed that debates on this
basic structure – constitutional debates, should involve the highest level of
negotiations and be settled by qualified or supermajorities only.  This rigidity,
however, provides only a relative guarantee. It is only effective if the political
actors concerned, are willing, when settling a constitutional issue, to take the
front door of a constitutional amendment and the accompanying procedure.
If a constitutional issue is regulated in another way, via a lower ranked
legislative authority (e.g. the parliamentary legislator), the constitutional
restrictions on amendability become idle. Regulating constitutional issues
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1. Cooter has expressed the dilemma neatly. According to him “a good constitution tilts without
tumbling over.” Robert D. Cooter (2000), The Strategic Constitution, Princeton New Jersey; Princeton
University Press, p. 372.
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that are or should be the prerogative (or reserve) of the constitutional legislator
by different means than the prescribed constitutional amendment procedure
may then ultimately undermine or erode the value of a constitution.
In this contribution, I will try to address the difficult question how we
can identify, in different constitutions, subjects or issues that can be settled
only by way of a constitutional amendment (constitutional reserves). I will
do so in two steps. After a brief discussion of the various shapes, sorts and
sizes of constitutions and the concept of ‘rigidity’ of constitutions, I will
examine, on the basis of examples from various countries, whether the
constitutions involved contain constitutional reserves. To that end I will look
into the concept of constitutional reserves and try to address the question
whether or not rigid constitutions and constitutional reserves trigger the
bypassing of laborious constitutional amendment procedures, resulting in
covert constitution building. In conclusion, I will try to discuss the advantages
and disadvantages of constitutional reserves in more general terms.
II. Prelude: What constitutes a Constitution?
Across the world, constitutions, as systems of government, come in a
whole range of shapes and sizes. If we look only at the form they are cast in,
we find that some countries have for the most part written constitutions
(United States, the Netherlands, South Africa) whereas other countries have
partly unwritten constitutions (United Kingdom).2  Many countries with a
written constitution have enshrined it in a single, separate document
(concentrated written constitution), whereas other countries, such as Sweden,
have a number of different constitutional documents (dispersed written
constitution).3
If we take a more substantive view and ask ourselves what kind of
rules constitutions normally express and what it is that constitutions do, other
constitutional notions come to the fore. Generally, constitutions define a
2. It is often suggested informally that the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution. This
is not strictly true; what it does not have is a single document setting out the legal framework and
functions of the organs of government and the rules by which it should operate. In this, the UK
currently differs from most other countries, for instance, the United States, Ireland, Germany,
France and South Africa etc. The constitution is not exclusively enshrined in one or some
documents. It is an organic system with an indeterminate content consisting of legal and non-legal
rules, case law and customs, conventions and standing orders all governing government. S.E.
Finer, Vernon Bogdanor and Bernard Rudden (1995), Comparing Constitutions. Oxford; Clarendon
Press, pp. 40-41.
3. See J.M. de Meij, ‘The Kingdom of Sweden’, in Lucas Prakke & Constantijn Kortmann (eds.)
(2004), Constitutional Law of 15 EU Member States. Deventer; Kluwer.
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state’s4  system of government.5 They embody the fundamental rules
establishing state institutions, public bodies, and their mutual relations as
well as the rules that determine the conditions under which these bodies are
authorized to perform legal acts (including the control mechanisms which
ensure that the rules will be enforced and the limits that have been drawn
will be complied with).6  Most constitutions are framed by a deliberate act of
a constituent power, which, in most liberal democracies, voices and/or
represents the will of the people. Hence, many constitutions are believed to
express the constitutional will of the people.
In modern constitutional literature the concept of ‘constitution’ is,
apart from the form it is cast in, generally used in three meanings. In its first
meaning, ‘constitution’ is equivalent to the act of constituting (performed by
a constituante) i.e. making or giving a constitution. In that case, ‘constitution’
is the legal act whereby a constitutional order is established. This classical
view could be called a formal concept of a constitution. In its second meaning,
constitution is used to denote the system of rules aimed at the limitation of
government power. In this functional view, a constitution aims to attribute
and limit government powers, and regulate and limit the public exercise of
it. In this meaning ‘constitution’ is often closely related to the central tenets
of constitutionalism.7  In its third meaning, the political view, a constitution
is exclusively linked with the national state and closely related to the idea of
popular sovereignty. According to this widespread view, a constitution is
4. We will confine ourselves to ‘state’ constitutions in this article. Regional and sub-state constitutions
and constitutions of private organizations or bodies are not taken into consideration.
5. In his classical book Modern Constitutions, Wheare draws a distinction between constitution in a
broad sense and constitution in a narrow sense. In its broad sense, a constitution means the whole
system of government of a country, the collection of rules (legal and non-legal) which establish and
regulate or govern the government. In a more narrow sense, a constitution is understood as a set
of legal rules which govern the government of a country and which have been embodied in a
document.  K. C Wheare (1960). Modern Constitutions, 2nd Edition (fifth impression of the 1966 2nd
edition), London, Oxford University Press, pp. 1-2.
6. See Wim Voermans and Henk Griffioen (2007), ‘The European Constitution and the Relation
between European and Member State Powers’, Journal for Comparative Government and European
Policy/Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften, 5 (1), pp. 27-28. Some argue that it is virtually
impossible to give an all-embracing, substantive definition of constitution due to the wide variety
of types of constitutions in the world past and present. The counter argument is equally valid: ‘why
would one want to?’ Henc van Maarseveen and Ger van der Tang (1978), Written Constitutions; a
Computerized Comparative Study. New York/Alphen aan den Rijn; Oceana Publications/Sijthoff
& Noordhoff.
7. Although the concept of ‘constitutionalism’ has different meanings (especially depending on
whether or not it is used in a descriptive or in a normative sense), the recurrent central element of
the concept is that of limited government under a higher law (i.e. the constitutional law of a
community). Alan Brudner (2004), Constitutional Goods, Oxford; Oxford University Press, pp. 38-39
and more in general, Part 1: Liberty.
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particularly a political act: an expression of the will of a sovereign people or
nation to manifest itself as an independent political entity (self-determination)
and to organise itself for this purpose as a state (constitutional autonomy).
This politically normative view of the concept of constitution is expressed,
for instance, in the Preamble to the US Constitution and followed as an idea
in a great many constitutions all over the world.8
A final characteristic feature of the concept of constitution is the notion
that a constitution cannot be amended in the same way as any other piece of
legislation. This is an essential notion that does not always receive the attention
it deserves. In the literature a distinction is made between flexible and rigid
constitutions. Rigid constitutions are difficult to amend (for example, because
of a complex or difficult amendment procedure), whereas flexible
constitutions can be amended more easily.9  This distinction is confusing to
a certain extent. First of all, because most of the many constitutions we
regard as ‘flexible’ in terms of their amendment procedure set extra
requirements on constitutional amendments, when compared to ordinary
statutes, for example.10  Even in countries whose fundamental constitutional
rules are not enshrined in a single constitutional document, but in mere
Acts of Parliament, there is usually a certain degree of rigidity due to de facto
respect for these parts of their constitution. For example, it is almost
inconceivable that the Westminster Parliament could amend the Bill of Rights
from 1688. The rigidity of a constitution reflects the fundamental nature of
it.11 This is what distinguishes constitutions from ordinary statutes. Kelsen
already understood that a constitution that can be amended in the same way
as any other statute results in a curious paradox. This constitution would be
a constitution only in name, because any ‘unconstitutional’ statute would,
as a result of the operation of the maxim lex posterior derogat priori, lead to a
change in the constitution, at least in terms of the sphere of validity of this
8. See Paul Cliteur and Wim Voermans (2008), Preambules (Preambles), a public report on a
comparative study into preambles worldwide, commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior
and Kingdom Relations, Leiden/The Hague (in Dutch).
9. Wheare (1960), pp. 15-19.
10. Wheare points out that ‘flexible’ is a relative concept. For example, the constitutions of France,
Austria and Norway are sometimes regarded as flexible, because, compared to the Constitution of
the United States, Denmark and Australia, they can be amended more easily. However, in France,
for example, a constitutional amendment is also subject to a procedure that is much stricter than
the procedure for ordinary legislative amendments (Article 89 of the French Constitution). Wheare
(1960), p. 16.
11. Sometimes the distinction between rigid and flexible constitutions is also defined in terms of the
difference between entrenched and non-entrenched constitutions. Even though there is a difference
in nuance, the essential characteristic of an entrenched constitution is the same as that of the rigid
constitution, i.e. that it is more difficult to amend than a regular statute.
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statute.12 Constitutions can be rigid not only in terms of their amendment
procedure but also in terms of their enforcement. Merryman and Pérez-
Perdomo draw an illuminating distinction between formally rigid
constitutions, which specify limitations on legislative power and define special
requirements for constitutional amendments (but make no provision for
enforcing these rules) on the one hand, and functionally rigid constitutions,
in which an organ (court, council) can review, in one way or other, the
constitutionality of legislative action.13  This functional rigidity, too, reflects
the fundamental nature of a constitution.
In brief, the quintessential characteristic of any constitution is its
fundamentality, expressed by some form of rigidity and its relationship to
regular statute (or parliamentary) law. In constitutional parlance, constitutions
without any supremacy over regular statutes, in whatever form, are not
regarded as a true ‘constitution’.
III. What belongs in a Constitution? Thoughts on a
Constitutional Reserve
The fundamentality of constitutions serves a purpose. It is designed to
provide protection against whimsical amendments of essential parts of a
system of government and against potential infringement of rights of
minorities and individuals as a result of chance majorities.14 Fundamentality
protects against the whim of the day and the capriciousness of political tides.
As we saw above, the protection provided by constitutions in most countries
consists in procedural safeguards (requirements concerning the constitutional
amendment procedure or the possibility of constitutional review). In some
countries, constitutional protection of specific rights is more far-reaching:
there, the fundamentality of the constitution is protected on the basis of
substantive criteria. An example can be found in Article 89(5) of the French
Constitution, which provides the following:
“The republican form of government shall not be the object of any
amendment.”
12. Hans Kelsen (1945), General Theory of Law and State, Translated by Anders Wedberg. 1999 Reprint.
Cambridge; Harvard University Press, pp. 263-266.
13. John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pérez-Perdomo (2007), The Civil Law Tradition, 3rd edition.
Stanford; Stanford University Press, pp. 136-137.
14. Schauer will not have any of this. He claims that there is nothing quintessential to a constitution.
Nothing makes a constitution constitutional, to his mind, nor does or can anything make a
constitution unconstitutional. Frederick Schauer (1995), ‘Amending the Presuppositions of a
Constitution’, in Responding to Imperfection: The Theory and Practice of Constitutional Amendment,
Princeton University Press, p. 145.
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A better known example is to be found in Article 79(3) of the German
Constitution – Basic Law – which reads:
“(3) An amendment of this Basic Law affecting the division of
the Federation into Länder, the participation in principle
of the Länder in legislation, or the basic principles laid
down in Articles 1 and 20,15  is inadmissible.”
The system of government and the basic rights are inalterably fixed in
these constitutions as a result of lessons learnt from the past.16  Even if the
reasons for this fixation are often understandable, a constitution with such
subject matter restrictions on amendments is somewhat rigid.17  Changes in
these constitutional no-go areas can be made only through a revolution or
as a result of unconstitutional conduct. For this reason, many constitutions
in the world do not fix constitutional content but, apart from the constitutional
amendment procedure itself, make a distinction between the constitutional
domain and the domain of lower ranking legislators, such as the parliamentary
legislator. For example, many of the world’s constitutions today permit the
parliamentary legislator to restrict fundamental or other rights entrenched
in the constitution, albeit subject to certain limitations. An example can be
found in Article 19, Abs. 1 and 2, of that same German Basic Law, which
reads as follows:
“(1) Insofar as under this Basic Law a basic right may be
restricted by or pursuant to a law, the law must apply
generally and not solely to an individual case. Furthermore
the law must name the basic right, indicating the Article.
  (2) In no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its essential
content.”
The second part expresses the Wesensgehaltgarantie, i.e. the guarantee
of essentiality, meaning that the exercise of the core of the fundamental
15. Containing the fundamental rights of German citizens.
16. The Japanese Constitution does not fix fundamental rights quite this strictly, but it has similar
effects. Furthermore, it deserves mentioning here for its sheer poetic quality. Article 97 of the
Japanese Constitution reads: ‘The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to
the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have survived the many
exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held
for all time inviolate.’
17. See Russell Patrick Plato (2007), ‘Selective Entrenchment against State Constitutional Change:
Subject Matter Restrictions and the Threat of Differential Amendability’. New York University Law
Review, Vol. 82, November 2007. Plato argues that subject matter restrictions on constitutional
amendments create a significant risk that barriers to amendment are being employed, intentionally
or otherwise, to entrench temporary political supermajorities against future constitutional change.
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right cannot be limited.18  In addition, constitutions often define the limits of
the powers to be conferred on the various state bodies and institutions under
a constitution.19
As far as I can see, a constitution hardly ever includes explicit rules
about subjects that are exclusively regulated by the constitutional legislator
and subjects that may also be regulated by other legislators. The constitutions
I know - admittedly, I do not know all of them in detail - do not contain
explicit provisions that reserve the regulation of specific subjects to the
constitutional legislator. Even so, such ‘constitutional reserves’20  exist by
implication.
Taking an example, the Dutch Constitution provides for a system of
limitations of fundamental rights, which is also found in other legal systems.
According to this system, a fundamental right may be restricted only if the
relevant article of the constitution includes a restrictive clause that expressly
permits this limitation.21  Under the Dutch Constitution, a limitation of a
fundamental right is possible only if there is a constitutional clause of this
kind and only in accordance with the conditions set by the clause.22
Sometimes a fundamental right does not include any clause, which means
that the right can be changed or restricted only through a constitutional
amendment.23  This is true of Article 3 of the Dutch Constitution, for example:
18. See Peter Haberle (1983), Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Artikel 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz : zugleich ein
Beitrag zum institutionellen Verstandnis der Grundrechte und zur Lehre vom Gesetzesvorbehalt, Heidelberg:
C.F. Muller.
19. In federations, for example, they may define the division between the powers of states or member
states and those of the federations; in unitary states, they may define the division of powers
between central government and local government but also the division of powers between the
branches of government itself (executive, legislature and judiciary).
20. In analogy to – what the Germans label – Vorbehalt des Gesetz. German constitutional doctrine,
however, does not have a Vorbehalt des Grundgesetz, although one might argue that there is an
implicit one: subject matter that is enshrined in Germany’s Basic Law and cannot be limited,
restricted or changed other than via constitutional amendment de facto constitutes a constitutional
reserve.
21. This doctrine was introduced on the occasion of the 1983 Revision of the Dutch Constitution. The
revisers of the Constitution rejected the system of implicit limitations of fundamental rights for a
variety of reasons (e.g. legal certainty, foreseeability) and embraced the system of explicit limitations
instead. See J. Chorus, et al. (eds.) (2000), Introduction to Dutch Law, The Hague/London/Boston;
Kluwer Law International, pp. 296-297.
22. See, for instance, Article 8 of the Dutch constitution, which reads: “The right of association shall
be recognized. This right may be restricted by Act of Parliament in the interest of public order.”
The last sentence expresses the clause, indicating that the right to free association can be restricted,
but only by an Act of Parliament.
23. Another example can be found in Article 5 (“Everyone shall have the right to submit petitions in
writing to the competent authorities.”) of the Dutch Constitution.
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“All Dutch nationals shall be equally eligible for appointment
to public service.”
No more, no less. Due to the system chosen, this means that this right
cannot even be changed or restricted through an Act of Parliament. The
right can only be changed or restricted by the constitutional legislator itself.
If we consider the constitutional reserve in this way, we can draw the
conclusion that this is not an uncommon phenomenon. A large number of
provisions from the world’s constitutions can be amended or restricted de
facto only through a constitutional amendment. I will call this phenomenon
a ‘negative constitutional reserve’.24  There is also such a thing as a ‘positive
constitutional reserve’ which has already been briefly discussed above. A
‘positive constitutional reserve’ occurs when a constitution itself positively and
explicitly (expressis verbis) provides that specific constitutional provisions or
topics can only be regulated, changed or restricted by the constitutional
legislator itself. We saw that there are not many constitutions that contain
explicit provisions about the exclusive domains of the constitutional legislator.
Occasionally, even the constitutional legislator itself is prohibited from
changing something, as we saw in Article 89 of the French Constitution and
Article 79 of the German Constitution. The American Constitution, too, has
such substantive limits on the power of amendment. Article V, for instance,
purports to prohibit a constitutional amendment that would deprive any
state of its equal suffrage in the Senate.25
Constitutional reserves are an interesting phenomenon, which has not
yet been widely studied. That is a pity, because, on the one hand,
constitutional reserves make it clear what belongs to the core of a constitution
of a country or an organization and, on the other hand, they provide a legal
handle to determine whether or not specific subjects may be regulated,
restricted or changed through constitutional amendment exclusively. While
many countries have defined theories about the question what subjects can
only be regulated in a Parliamentary Act and what subjects can be regulated
through delegated legislation or statutory instruments (e.g. the German
24. In all likelihood, Jacobsohn would call most of them ‘implied limits on constitutional amendments’.
See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn (2006), ‘An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective.’
International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 4, no. 3, pp. 460-487.
25. Tushnet argues that Article I of the US Constitution provides another example. See Mark Tushnet
(2009), The Constitution of the United States of America; a contextual analysis, Oxford and Portland,
Oregon; Hart Publishing, p. 239.
Constitutional Reserves and Covert Constitutions
92 Indian J. Const. L.
doctrine of Vorbehalt des Gesetzes or its equivalents in other countries), there
is no such theory in the field of constitutions.26  As a result, there is a lack of
transparent criteria in legal and political practice and as a matter of fact, we
also have an insufficient insight into the manner in which constitutional law
is developing under or independent of the constitution proper (bypassing
the constitutional route altogether). This also applies to fields in respect of
which the constitutional legislator had determined that they could be changed
only through a constitutional amendment.
Below, I will try to establish on the basis of a number of debates in
various countries and at EU level whether a constitutional reserve is in play,
of what type and sort, and how it is handled in practice. I will discuss a few
examples from France, the Netherlands, India and Ireland and conclude by
considering the European Union. It is a brief excursion with a limited
purpose. I will not address the entire issue of deviations from a constitution,
but confine myself to the (non) observance of constitutional reserves in
proposed or adopted parliamentary acts in these countries. Due to the same
self-restriction, I will not pay attention to the seriousness of non-observance
of constitutional reserve nor to the question whether these deviations are
perhaps justified.27  Not because I do not have an opinion on the foregoing
but simply because the issue is too wide-ranging and too complex to address
in the context of this article. I will confine myself to the question whether
the examples given reveal the existence of a constitutional reserve (and the
type of constitutional reserve) and I will then highlight the debates this gives
rise to. In the final section, I will try to draw some conclusions on the basis of
the foregoing.
A. France
The first constitutional system under consideration is that of the French
Republic. As seen earlier, Article 89 of the French Constitution contains a
provision that forbids even the constitutional legislator to change the
republican system of government. Now one might say that this is a
meaningless provision, because if the constitutional legislator were to decide
to repeal this article pursuant to the normal constitutional procedure, it would
26. This kind of theory is necessary and would be useful as a guideline for constitutional revision.
Harris advocates that “it would be (…) advisable to develop essential principles that would guide a
choice as to whether a particular Constitutional change were substantially invalid.” William Harris
(1993), The Interpretable Constitution, Johns Hopkins University Press, p. 188.
27. On this subject, see the fine paper by Thomas Poole (2008), Constitutional Exceptionalism and the
Common Law. LSE Working Papers 14/2008; London School of Economics.
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be very difficult for a court or any other government power to do anything
about it. Even so, this article was included as a memento to impress the
fundamental nature of the republican system of government upon posterity.
In addition to this positive reserve, the French Constitution includes
negative reserves, like many other constitutions in the world. One of them
became relevant in 1962, when Charles de Gaulle wanted to create the
possibility of direct election of the Président de la République through an
amendment of the young French Constitution from 1958.28 Article 89 of the
1958 Constitution provides the procedure for amending the Constitution. It
stipulates that constitutional amendments cannot be effected without the
cooperation of the French parliament (both the Sénat and the Assemblée
nationale). From the beginning, it was clear that de Gaulle’s proposed
amendment was not going to be supported by a majority in parliament.
This is why de Gaulle tried to amend the Constitution using the procedure
of Article 11 of that same Constitution, which provides for the possibility of
subjecting bills to a referendum. Ignoring the constitutional amendment
procedure of Article 89 of the Constitution, he wanted to submit the proposal
concerning the direct election of the President direct to the French people.
A storm of protest swept through the country as a result of this unconstitutional
plan.29  According to many, Article 11 of the Constitution had never been
intended as a means to amend the Constitution. The President of the Senate
and the opposition criticized the government for this ‘outrageous breach of
the Constitution’ and even forced the government to resign. This, however,
did not stop de Gaulle putting the bill proposing Presidential election by
general suffrage up for a vote in a national referendum. In a five-hour meeting
on 1 October 1962, the Conseil Constitutionnel was briefly consulted prior to
the referendum. It advised against the use of the Article 11 procedure to
amend the Constitution. De Gaulle proceeded anyway and gained a
favourable result on 28 October 1962.30  Still, not everybody agreed. The
President of the Senate referred the loi to the Conseil Constitutionnel, claiming
it was unconstitutional.31  In its decision of 6 November 1962, the Conseil32
held that it was not competent to entertain such a reference, since it was
28. The later ‘Loi n°62-1292 du 6 novembre 1962 relative à l’élection du Président de la République au
suffrage universel.’
29. On this subject, see the detailed discussion in John Bell (1994), French Constitutional Law, Oxford;
Clarendon Press, pp. 133-135.
30. A reported 13 million voters were in favour, and 8 million voted against the bill. See C.J.A.M.
Kortmann (2009), Staatsrecht en raison d’Etat (Constitutional Law and Raison d’Etat). Valedictory
address at Radboud University Nijmegen. Deventer; Kluwer, pp. 8-10.
31. On the basis of Article 61(2) of the French Constitution.
32. Conseil Constitutionnel decision no. 60-662 DC of 6 November 1962, Referendum Law, Decision 14.
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merely competent to judge lois voted on by Parliament.33
This French example makes it clear that the French Constitution
contained a negative constitutional reserve: Article 89 of the then French
Constitution constituted the exclusive route for constitutional amendments
and did not permit any constitutional amendment through a referendum
initiated by a president. But this was exactly what De Gaulle did: bypassing
the constitutional reserve of Article 89 of the French Constitution. Most
observers and commentators (even the Conseil Constitutionnel, in its first
opinion) agree on this point and value Article 89 for what it is: an implicit
constitutional reserve with respect to constitutional amendments.
B. India
The second system to be considered is that of India. In a landmark
decision from 1973 (Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala )34, the Supreme
Court of India held that certain principles within the framework of the Indian
Constitution are inviolable and hence cannot be amended by Parliament,
even if the Indian constitutional amendment procedure provided for simple
majority amendment by Parliament. The Supreme Court referred to this
framework of inviolable principles as the ‘Basic Structure’ of the Constitution.
This was a far-reaching decision of the Court because Article 368 of the
Constitution of India grants the Indian Parliament the right to act as
constituent power in the case of constitutional amendments.35  In theory, the
Indian Parliament could and can therefore amend the Constitution in every
desirable way and in every sense. Amendments and additions to the
Constitution duly enacted by Parliament are essentially immune to judicial
review as well.36  What induced the Court to rule on the face of things, in
contrast to the letter of the Constitution?
The Kesavananda-case related to a constitutional amendment that
sought to restrict fundamental rights (in particular, the right to property)37,
an issue highly controversial at the time. The Supreme Court considered
33. Bell (1994), p. 134.
34. AIR 1973 SC 1461.
35. Article 368 (1) reads: “Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise
of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this
Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.”
36. This was the established position taken by the Supreme Court until 1967 (as is shown by the
decision in Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1965 (1) SCR 933). In I.C. Golak Nath and others v. State
of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643, the Supreme Court changed its position because it ruled that duly
enacted amendments could not be permitted to render basic constitutional rights unenforceable.
37. Jacobsohn (2006), pp. 473-474.
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that even though Parliament is entitled to amend the Constitution and limit
rights in the public interest, even the fundamental rights from Part III of the
Constitution, these rights cannot be completely abrogated. The fundamental
importance of the freedom of the individual has to be preserved for all times
to come and it cannot be amended so as to render it out of existence.
According to the Supreme Court, it follows from the nature of the
Constitution, as expressed in the Preamble as well, that this Basic Structure
of the Constitution must be protected.
The effects of the Indian Marbury v. Madison38 seemed to be short-
lived. The Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act, 1976 tried to reduce
the ability of India’s Supreme and High Courts to proclaim laws constitutional
or unconstitutional. A new fourth clause to Article 368 of the Indian
Constitution provides that no amendment to the Constitution (including the
provisions of Part III) ‘made or purporting to have been made under this
article shall be called in question in any court on any ground.’
The Courts, however, stood their ground. In Minerva Mills Ltd. v.
Union of India,39  the Supreme Court held that this fourth (and the fifth for
that matter) clause of Article 368 of the Constitution were unlawful. Consistent
to its Kesavananda-ruling,40 the Court took the view that since the power of
Parliament to amend the Constitution is limited, it cannot, by amending the
Constitution, convert its limited power into an unlimited power (as Parliament
had tried to do by adopting the Forty-Second Amendment (Act, s. 55) resulting
in clauses four and five of Article 368 of the Constitution).
The Kesavananda and Minerva Mills cases, too, provide examples of a
negative constitutional reserve in the Indian Constitution. In arguing that
specific parts of the Constitution, the Basic structure, cannot be amended in
such a manner that nothing is left of it, the Supreme Court expresses the
idea of ‘structural essentiality’, a concept which is also known to the German
Constitution.41  Like the French example, this example reveals the controversy
of court-imposed restrictions to constitutional amendments.
C. The Netherlands
The Netherlands does not have a constitutional court; the Dutch
38. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
39. Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625.
40. The ruling was reaffirmed in the case of Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, AIR 1975 SC 2299
dealing with the imposition of the Emergency of 25 June 1975 through 21 March 1977. In this latter
ruling, the Supreme Court struck down clause 4 of article 329-A, inserted by the 39th Amendment
in 1975, on the ground that it was beyond the amending power of the parliament as it destroyed the
basic structure of the Constitution.
41. My Indian colleague tells me that the Indian Courts took this concept from the German Constitution.
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Constitution even prohibits constitutional review of Acts of Parliament.42
This constitutional system has resulted in the Dutch courts showing great
reverence for the parliamentary legislator which expresses the will of the
people.43 Even when an Act of Parliament was enacted without due
observance of the constitutionally prescribed procedure, the Dutch Supreme
Court proved unwilling to review the contested Act, claiming Article 120
even forbids the courts to review the procedure.44
The check on the constitutionality of constitutional amendment bills
is for the most part performed by the Dutch Council of State, the chief advisory
body of the Dutch government. The Council’s opinion is influential and
authoritative: it is published and attached to the bill it pertains to when this
is submitted to Parliament.
In various opinions in recent years, the Council of State has defined a
position about the limits the Constitution imposes on the legislator. For
example, the Council has stated on various occasions that specific subjects,
such as a binding referendum, cannot be regulated by the parliamentary
legislator, but only through constitutional revision.45  In a widely discussed
opinion of September 2007, the question of the significance of the
Constitution arises. On 1 June 2005, the Dutch electorate rejected the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe in a referendum organised for that
purpose. Together with the French ‘no’, this triggered a crisis in the
constitutional process of the European Union, a crisis that was resolved by
the compromise of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007. The Treaty of Lisbon bears
a strong resemblance to this initial European constitution, although its state-
like regalia, such as a flag, an anthem and a catalogue of fundamental rights,
have been removed from it. In view of this strong resemblance, there were
Dutch politicians who insisted that this new Treaty of Lisbon be subjected to
a referendum as well. It seemed illogical to subject one draft treaty to a
referendum, but not the other.  The government was at a loss as to what to
do next and decided to submit the question, whether or not to hold a
referendum, to the Dutch Council of State. In its opinion of 12 September
42. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution reads: “The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and
treaties shall not be reviewed by the courts.”
43. Wim Voermans (2003), De bestuursrechter en artikel 120 Grondwet (Administrative Courts and
Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution). Jurisprudentie bestuursrecht Plus (Collection of Administrative
Case Law) (Nov. 2003), pp. 142-151.
44. Supreme Court 27 January 1961, NJ 1963, 248 with a note by DJ. Veegens (Van den Bergh
judgment).
45. See the opinion on the bill concerning temporary rules governing the advisory corrective referendum
(Temporary Referendum Act), Parliamentary Papers II 1999/00, 27 034 B (opinion W04.99.0615/I).
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2007,46  the Council of State first observes that, in contrast to its predecessor,
the Treaty establishing a Constitution for the European Union, the EU Reform
Treaty (i.e. the later Lisbon Treaty), as foreseen at the European Council
meeting in June, does not have a constitutional character. The Council draws
this controversial47  conclusion from matters connected with the character of
the adoption method and the content of the Reform Treaty. The Lisbon
Treaty parties do not seem to have the ambition to negotiate a constitution,
as is shown by the absence of characteristic constitutional elements such as
fundamental rights, constitutional symbols (flag, anthem, etc.) and a
fundamental change in the division of powers between the Union and
Member States. Moreover, the Reform Treaty does not repeal the earlier
treaties, as the European Constitution did.
The Council of State does not confine itself to assessing the
constitutionality of the Reform Treaty, but goes one step further and expresses
its opinion on the possibility of holding referendums on the approval of
treaties. The Council holds that the Dutch Constitution contains a closed
system in relation to the approval of treaties, in which parliamentary approval
is the basic principle (enshrined in Article 91 of the Dutch Constitution).
That means two things. First, that there is no room for binding referendums
as regards the approval of treaties and, second, that a special justification
must exist for a consultative referendum about the approval of a treaty such
as the Reform Treaty, which is not constitutional. “The mere precedent”,
the Council holds, “is insufficient for holding a referendum, because this
would essentially create a structural referendum facility (for the approval of
treaties), which does not fit in with the closed system [my italics, WV] of the
Constitution.”
Accordingly, the reasoning of the Council of State underlines the
existence of a negative constitutional reserve in the Dutch Constitutional
System. As elsewhere, it is a controversial one.
D. The European Union
On the face of it, it is not self-evident to search for constitutional reserves
in the context of the European Union. The European Union is a treaty
organization rather than a state and, on the face of it, again, it does not have
46. W02.07.0254/B (also published in Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 091, no. 4).
47. A.T.J.M. Jacobs (2008), ‘Het Verdrag van Lissabon en de Europese grondwet. Is er een “overtuigend
onderscheid?” (‘The Lisbon Treaty and the European Constitution; a Convincing Distinction?’)
Nederland Juristenblad (Dutch Lawyers Journal), pp. 320 – 329.
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a constitution, but two basic treaties (Treaty establishing the European Union,
TUE and the Treaty establishing the European Community, TEC). Even so,
this search is useful, because even though there is a debate on the question
whether the primary law of the EC/EU is constitutional law,48  it is now
assumed that the EU and EC Treaties, and the case law the European Court
of Justice has developed on the basis of that, does in fact operate as
constitutional law.49
According to the Court of Justice, the treaties constitute a Community
which functions as a new legal order of international law (Van Gend & Loos
judgment 1962 )50. Furthermore, the Community has created its own legal
system which has become an integral part of the legal systems of the Member
States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating this Community
of unlimited duration, the Court of Justice observed in the Costa/Enel
judgment of 1964,51  the member states have limited their sovereign rights
and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals and
themselves. Additional evidence of the constitutionality of the EU/EC is that
the TEC/TEU can only be amended under qualified requirements, i.e. by
the Treaty Powers themselves. And to round it up: the Treaties establish
institutions, attribute powers to these institutions and limit them; fundamental
rights apply;52  the institutions are subject to the rule of law and the principles
of democracy (transparency and the partaking of the European Parliament
in most of the lawmaking); the EU has an independent court and competitive
branches of government.
The European Union has constitutional reserves as well. One of the
most important principles of community law is the principle of attributed
48. See Armin von Bogdandy (2006), ‘Constitutional Principles’, in Armin von Bogdandy and Jürgen
Blast, Principles of European Constitutional Law. Oxford and Portland Oregon; Hart Publishing, pp.
3-4.
49. See Koen Lenaerts and Piet van Nuffel (Robert Bray, ed.) (2004), Constitutional Law of the European
Union, Sweet and Maxwell.
50. European Court of Justice (ECJ) 5 February 1963. NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming
van Gend & Loos v Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration, C-26/62.
51. ECJ 15 July 1964 Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L, C-6/64.
52. ECJ International Handelsgesellschaft mbH v Einfuhr etc. [1970] ECR 1125, where the ECJ declared
that it would protect human rights as an integral part of EU law; ECJ Nold v Commission [1974] ECR
491, where the ECJ declared that international human rights treaties on which Member States
collaborated, or to which they were signatories, also provided guidelines which should be followed
within the framework of EU law. No measure could have the force of law unless it was compatible
with the fundamental rights recognised and protected by the Member States’ constitutions, and
finally ECJ Rutili [1975] ECR 1219 and Hauer v Land-Rheinland-Pfalz [1979] ECR 321, where the ECJ
confirmed that the rights protected by the ECHR form part of Community law. Admittedly, the
fundamental rights did not make it into the Treaties. The idea of making fundamental rights part
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powers or the principle of conferral (as it is also known). This principle
means that the Union may exercise only those powers conferred on it by the
Treaties. There is no such thing as general competence or implied powers –
in the strict sense of the word – vested in the Union; the institutions may act
only where the treaties expressly grant them permission to do so. In other
words: this principle is the meta-constitutional reserve as regards the
constitutional order of the EU.
The EU Court of Justice also applied it as such in Germany v. Council
(Tobacco Advertisement Directive case).53  In this judgment, the Court annulled
Directive 98/43 prohibiting the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco
products54 on the ground that it did not fall within the scope of competences
to regulate the internal market (Article 100a). The Court was of the opinion
that Article 100a, interpreted in the light of Articles 3(1)(c) (subsidiarity) and
14 respectively, permits the Community legislature to adopt measures
intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of
the internal market, but
“to construe that article as meaning that it vests in the Community
legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would
not only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions
cited above but would also be incompatible with the principle
embodied in Article 3b of the EC Treaty (now Article 5 TEC)
that the powers of the Community are limited to those
specifically conferred on it.”
This is an important decision because the Court of Justice’s
interpretation of the power to take measures for the purpose of promoting
the internal market had been quite liberal until then. The Court of Justice
followed a more restrictive line in 2000 and concluded from the conjunction
of provisions, and, consequently, from the nature of the Treaty, where the
limits of the legislative powers of the institutions with respect to the internal
market lay. If the institutions should have additional powers, this would be
possible only by amending the treaty.
of the Treaty lapsed together with the proposed Treaty establishing a constitution for the European
Union. At this juncture, however, the EU has a Charter on Human Rights, which is not legally
binding as such but serves as an important inspiration. If the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified, the
Union will – in all likelihood - join the European Convention on Human Rights.
53. ECJ Case C-376/98 (2000) ECR I-8419.
54. Directive 98/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States relating
to the advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products, OJ EU 1992, L 213.
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The Court’s decision in an environmental criminal case is just as
fundamental. In these proceedings, the Court struck down a framework
decision on criminal sanctions applying to environmental protection,55 which
had been adopted by the Council on a Third Pillar legal base.56 First, the
Court of Justice determined that the framework had actually been defined
on the incorrect legal basis. It should have properly been adopted on the
basis of Article 175 of the EC Treaty. In those circumstances, the entire
framework decision, based on Title VI of the EU Treaty, encroaches on the
powers Article 175 of the EC Treaty confers on the Community. The Court
then renders a very fundamental decision on the question whether the Union
may actually impose criminal penalties. While the Court confirms that, as a
general rule, criminal law and criminal procedures are matters which do not
fall within the scope of the EC Treaty, this does not
“prevent the Community legislature, when the application of
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties by the
competent national authorities is an essential measure for
combating serious environmental offences, from taking measures
which relate to the criminal law of the Member States which it
considers necessary in order to ensure that the rules which it
lays down on environmental protection are fully effective.”
This means that the competences of the institutions, particularly the
legislator, of the Union have increased considerably here. This includes their
power to sanction, even where Article 175 does not grant TEC any such
power. And if there is no power, it is, according to the principal of conferral
(acting as a negative constitutional reserve), not allowed to regulate.
Covert constitutional developments
The principle of the limited powers (principle of conferral) limits, as
we have seen, the scope of action of the institutions. Apart from the blessings,
such as the preservation of sovereignty for the Member States and
entrenchment of the original intentions of the contracting parties, this entails
significant restrictions. The principle of conferral sometimes poses an obstacle
to flexible and decisive Union action. This very inability of the Union to
take swift and effective action to meet such major challenges as climate change
and environmental issues, internal financial market control and energy and
foreign policy has aroused a great deal of criticism. This problem has been
55. 2003/80/JHA of 27 January 2003.
56. ECJ Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council.
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recognised from 2001 on57 and, subsequently, the Treaty establishing a
Constitution for the European Union makes an attempt to define answers to
it. The fate of this European Constitution from 2004 and the lengthy road
leading to the Treaty of Lisbon which still has not been ratified by all Member
States, reveals the difficult route of radical treaty changes and the
corresponding deepening of the constitutionalization process in the EU.
Within the 27 Member States there are major differences of opinion about
the future development of the EU. And this will make it even more difficult
to introduce treaty changes in the future, which, in turn may paralyse the
decision-making process in the Union.
This pending constitutional stalemate (urgent need to improve the
Union’s decisiveness and the painstaking process of treaty change) has, over
the past ten years led to quite a remarkable phenomenon: ‘covert
constitutional development’. This refers to the adoption of constitutional
rules, such as fundamental rights; rules governing the relationship between
the institutions involved in the legislative process; rules that govern the
relationship between the European legislator and the executive; rules and
customs that, in brief, concern the system of government of the EU. I call
such rules ‘covert’ if these:
(a) concern subjects that are included in the TEC/TEU, but where the
treaties themselves do not give the institutions any explicit power to
adopt further rules for these;
(b) concern subjects that are not governed by the treaties.
In view of the scope of this article, I will mention a few. The first
concerns the trilogues. Article 251 of the TEC enshrines the ‘co-decision
procedure’, the Union’s common legislative procedure involving the
European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of
Ministers. The procedure provides for a system in which the Commission
submits a legislative proposal to the Council and the Parliament, which may
amend (or reject) the proposal in a first reading. If, after a first reading, the
Council and the Parliament see eye to eye, they can enact the proposal; if
this is not the case, the Council may present a common position, which in
turn is submitted to Parliament. Again, Parliament may amend the common
position in a second reading (or reject it altogether). If, after a second reading,
Parliament and Council still fail to agree on an identical text, a conciliation
committee, consisting of members of Parliament and from the Council, may
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be called upon: the committee will try to come up with a compromise
proposal, which in turn is submitted to both Parliament and the Council to
be enacted or rejected. The trilogues system means that immediately after
the first reading (or during the second reading), an informal conciliation
committee is formed to present a compromise proposal.
Undoubtedly, this procedure, which has become quite popular by now,
helps to speed up the legislative process, but it is not provided for in the treaties:
these permit conciliation only after the second reading and do not provide for
any Commission contribution.58  This is not an isolated phenomenon; in the
spirit of the treaties, the institutions involved in the legislative process make all
kinds of arrangements with each other, which are not provided for in the treaties.
One of them is the comitology procedure, under which implementing powers
are conferred on the Commission by the EU’s legislative bodies. In the process
of drawing up these implementing measures, the Commission must act in
conjunction with committees of national civil servants, who often have the power
to block the Commission and refer the matter to the Council. This seems to be
inconsistent with Article 202 of the TEC, which provides that the Commission
bears sole responsibility for implementation measures after they have been
conferred in a legislative act. Until recently, the comitology procedure was a
matter of controversy, especially in relation to the position of the European
Parliament, which was not involved as a partner in the comitology procedure.
The comitology decisions of 1999 and 2006 solved many of these problems.59
The above forms of covert constitutional engineering are only some of many
examples. Even the Van Gend & Loos, Costa/Enel and Handelsgesellschaft
judgments of the Court of Justice, discussed above, may be perceived as covert
constitutional developments. Most present-day commentators and European
experts do not, and may be rightly so, feel that most of the methods of sub-
constitutional engineering I dealt with are very problematic.60  Eiselt and
58. Schackleton and Raunio emphasize that trilogues have now become an uncontested part of the
conciliation procedure. It would be fair to say that it is uncontested only among the institutions so
far. M. Shackleton, & T. Raunio, (2003), ‘Codecision since Amsterdam: a laboratory for institutional
innovation and change’ Journal of European Public Policy, 10(2), pp. 171-187. Keading and Hägen are
more critical on trilogues: they highlight the informal and sometimes somewhat intransparent
character of the procedure, as well as the backdrops for MEPs. Frank M. Häge, and Michael
Kaeding (2007), ‘Reconsidering the European Parliament’s Legislative Influence: Formal v. Informal
Procedures’, Journal of European Integration, 29 (3), pp. 341-361.
59. Council decision of 17 July 2006 amending Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for
the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission (Comitology decision) (2006/
512/EC).
60. Curtin argues that we should not be too dogmatic in our approaches to the Union. She notes that
the EU is clearly still under construction. It is not premised on a fully fledged system of parliamentary
democracy (and probably never will be), since there are no unbroken chains of delegation and of
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Slominski, in discussing the phenomenon of inter-institutional agreements feel
that, when such agreements specify a treaty provision without an explicit
authorization, this may result in circumvention of the time-consuming procedure
of Treaty amendment, and result in trading higher level negotiations in for
lower level ones.61
If, however, we apply the principle of limited attribution (or conferral)
very strictly and regard it as an actual constitutional reserve, incidentally,
the ECJ seems to be doing just that in the Tobacco Advertisement Directive case,
many of these practical and productive sub-constitutional arrangements
suddenly appear to be problematic. These sub-constitutional developments
are problematic not only at the technical level of EU law and the treaties,
but, possibly, also in terms of the democratic deficit the EU is facing. Seen as
a constitutional reserve, the principle of limited attribution is also designed
to guarantee control of the European public over the content of constitutional
law in the Treaties. Substantial covert constitutional activity contributes to
the feeling of a bureaucratic, undemocratic, uncontrollable Union with an
agenda of its own. This aspect was a significant factor in Dutch popular
feeling leading up to the ‘no’ on the European Constitution in 2005.
IV. Conclusion: The Effects of Constitutional Reserves
In this contribution, I have discussed constitutional reserves, i.e. the
phenomenon that constitutions sometimes provide that specific subjects or
issues must exclusively be settled in the constitution itself. These types of
provisions come in various shapes and forms. I divided these into positive
ones (expressly defined in the Constitution) and negative ones (provisions –
written or unwritten – that have the effect of a constitutional reserve). These
provisions are not unusual. The list of examples of constitutional reserves in
constitutional systems, which I gave above, can be added to effortlessly.62
Constitutional reserves, especially negative (or implied) ones, are common
and not unusual. Constitutional reserves are in the splits between the
requirements of law on the substance of a constitution on the one hand, and
accountability reaching (up and down) to the citizen. One of the main problems – in her mind –
regarding the checks and balances under construction in the ‘undergrowth’ of legal and institutional
practice is the chronic lack of transparency of the overall system. Curtin, D. (2007), ‘Holding
(Quasi-) Autonomous EU Administrative Actors to Public Account’, European Law Journal, Vol.
13, No. 4, July 2007, p. 523–541.
61. Isabella Eisselt and Peter Slominski (2006), ‘Sub-Constitutional Engineering: Negotiation, Content
and Legal Value of Interinstitutional Agreements in the EU’, European Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 2,
March 2006, pp. 209-225.
62. Jacobsohn gives a few examples from Peru and Ireland, and besides, he confines himself to
countries that faced the problem of unconstitutional amendments; the theme of constitutional
reserves is much more comprehensive than that. Jacobsohn (2006), pp. 462-463.
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the demands of popular sovereignty on the other. These are methods to
deal with the tension from these forces and create a balance in a constitution.
Constitutional reserves may prevent rash amendments of specific essential
elements from the constitution (fundamental rights, the basic structure of the
government system, etc.) or prevent these essential elements from being
regulated outside the constitutional amendment procedure. Further, the
analysis shows that negative constitutional reserves that are unwritten and
that the court infers from the constitutional system are controversial (India,
the Netherlands). What is also striking is that even in countries with clearly
identifiable constitutional reserves, there is hardly any theory formation
concerning the question why specific subjects may be regulated only, in
view of essentiality, for example, through the constitutional procedure. I
agree with Harris that much can be gained by developing essential principles
that would guide the choice as to what is fixed in those countries that have
constitutional reserves, what is amendable and what can only be regulated
through a constitutional procedure.
One last observation. The example of the European Union reveals a
special, somewhat unsettling, effect of the constitutional reserve of the Union
(the principle of conferral): covert constitutional developments. Because,
according to a strict interpretation of the principle of conferral, specific
essential institutional issues can be settled only through a Treaty amendment,
this principle is, over the last decades, being applied in a creative fashion.
The possible consequence is that substantive parts of EU constitutional law
are elaborated without the involvement of the populations of the Member
States or the Member States themselves as contracting parties. A process
Majone had aptly labelled as ‘integration by stealth’.63 This involves a big
risk for the future of the EU: establishing a constitution and losing the people.
Come what may for the EU, the possible covert constitutional practice
raises a more general question. Is this a common effect of strict constitutional
reserves? It would be very interesting to see and know whether rigid
constitutions do typically trigger covert constitution building or – more often
– not. A question we here at Leiden will be looking into in the near future.
63. G. Majone (2005), Dilemmas of European Integration: The Ambiguities and Pitfalls of Integration by
Stealth, Oxford University Press.
